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The Oil Weapon:
Myth of  China’s Vulnerability
Bruce Blair, Chen Yali, and Eric Hagt
The Sword of  Damocles
The geopolitical canvass on which China plots its strategy for energy secu-
rity displays a ubiquitous presence of  one country: the United States.  Chinese 
energy security planners must reckon with America’s ravenous consumption 
of  imported oil, its strategic alliances with other heavy importers of  oil in Asia, 
its overseas military operations in the heart of  the world’s leading oil produc-
ing region, its naval dominion over the world’s oil transportation routes, and 
the global domination of  U.S. oil companies or multinational oil companies 
heavily capitalized by American investment.  This is the context in which 
China pursues its energy security, sometimes blandly described as ‘conserva-
tion and diversification of  supply’, which masks the nation’s real struggle to 
satisfy its rapidly growing energy needs without exposing its energy lifelines to 
external forces that may, intentionally or not, betray China’s interests.
Chinese planners view oil as a strategic political commodity that requires a 
national plan to ensure its reliable flow from abroad, and cringe at the thought 
of  surrendering its provision to foreign control of  any stripe. Whether this 
is foreign business interests driven by the profit motive, the vagaries of  the 
‘invisible hand’ marketplace, unaccountable and faceless transnational deci-
sion-makers, American foreign policy pressure, or U.S. naval warships, China’s 
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anxiety is magnified by its perception, real and imagined, that it lacks control 
over market and strategic factors in times of  emergency.
China’s main vulnerability stems from its fast-growing dependence on 
Middle Eastern oil.  China’s surging imports, rising from zero net imports in 
1993 to 2 million barrels a day now to 8 million barrels daily in 2020 (roughly 
the same amount as all of  Saudi Arabia’s current daily export), will inevitably 
elevate the Middle East to the top of  China’s supply chain.  For all the contro-
versial inroads China has been making into far-flung oil fields in regions like 
South America, and the deals it may strike with neighboring producers like 
Russia, China will depend on the Middle East for the vast bulk of  its growing 
oil imports for the foreseeable future.
This reality means that China is becoming entwined in the complex geo-
politics of  the region and, for better or worse, is becoming hostage to U.S. oil 
diplomacy.  On the positive side of  the ledger, that diplomacy actually reduces 
China’s vulnerability to the extent that it 
accomplishes its primary aim – maintain-
ing the reliable flow of  oil to the world 
market at moderate prices.   This aim 
requires the United States to militarily 
defend the energy infrastructure of  the 
Middle East and to keep an economics-
minded, responsible Saudi regime in control of  OPEC pricing.  To this end 
the United States has spent over $1 trillion over the past two decades, and 
China has reaped a huge benefit at little cost to itself.  The U.S. intervention 
that drove Saddam Hussein out of  Kuwait, for instance, restored oil stability 
to the region and led to a decade of  low oil prices, a benefit enjoyed by China 
during its economic take-off  in the 1990s.
On the negative side, the latest assertive intervention by the United States 
into the Middle East has destabilized the region. This turmoil coupled with 
increasing weakness in the so-called fundamentals of  the global oil market 
– declining investment in global exploration and production resulting in a 
shrinking oil reserve base, accelerating demand caused by the growing U.S., 
Chinese, Indian, and other economies, and cyclical stagnation of  production 
capacity of  non-OPEC suppliers – has spurred a steady rise in “oil security 
premiums”, a kind of  “fear surcharge” tacked onto the “normal” price of  
a barrel of  crude.  The price of  crude has sky-rocketed on the back of  this 
The United States has spent 
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surcharge.  Although most credible projections portray the future world oil 
picture over the next 20 years as one of  sufficient supply to meet growing 
demand, the “fear premium” now seems to be locked into the psyche of  
oil futures dealers, and the price of  oil seems to be increasingly inelastic as 
a result – developed and developing nations alike cannot seem to slake their 
thirst for this liquid gold regardless of  its cost.
China’s Quest for Energy Security
Mounting oil anxiety is playing on China’s historically deep-seated psycho-
logical commitment to energy self-reliance, leading China to press harder its 
claims on resource-rich but disputed territories such as the East China Sea, 
pitting it against a number of  equally oil-hungry nations.  Many of  these 
neighboring nations vying with China for bigger slices of  the resource pie 
also harbor bitterness and suspicion toward one another based on historical 
grievances.  This simmering hostility beneath the surface coupled with the 
fact that many of  them such as Japan are staunch allies of  the United States 
furthers the Chinese perception that the United States could threaten its 
energy security.
China’s mindset of  self-reliance accommodates its growing dependency 
on imported oil by searching exhaustively for exclusive bilateral deals with 
producers and suppliers around the globe, including U.S.-designated “pariah 
oil states” such as Iran, Sudan, Cuba and Venezuela.  China’s “nationalistic” 
diversification of  its supplies through exclusive relationships with any and all 
oil-rich nations willing to deal has been widely reproached, including criticism 
that the practice distorts the global open market for oil.  In reality, however, 
the means of  production in the oil sector are predominantly controlled by 
governments, not the marketplace (which does regulate the oil futures and 
spot markets).  In economic terms, furthermore, the so-called “equity oil” 
deals in theory do not reduce the global supply of  oil or raise its price.  On 
the contrary, it tends to boost investment in the oil sector overall and thus 
contribute in a positive way to increasing production and lowering prices.  In 
practice, China’s stiff  competition for upstream oil deals does work to bid 
up the price of  an increasingly scarce commodity.  China’s investment forays 
are also driven less by sound financial risk assessment than by foreign policy 
interests, and hence in economic terms they fall short of  rigorous business 
practices.
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China’s fears of  energy 
insecurity peak with the 
specter of  Sino-American 
tension and conflict leading to 
a U.S. blockade of  China’s oil 
imports from the Middle East.
In any case these Chinese investment forays in often faraway lands do not 
really promise China any real energy security. They will produce too little oil 
too slowly to offset China’s rapidly growing imports, and most of  the oil will 
not even enter China at all. Transportation costs will be so high that the oil 
generally will be sold or swapped for other oil that will enter China.1 
These upstream deals and any successful claims on disputed oil sources 
will by no stretch of  the imagination relieve China of  its dependency on 
Middle Eastern oil.  The die is cast for China to increase that dependency, 
and by implication to yield significant control of  its energy future to regional 
forces beyond its control, including powerful forces associated with the U.S. 
government, military, and big oil interests.  China thus has cause to worry 
that the pervasive instability in the region could lead to severe disruption of  
supply and to further sharp increases in the global price of  oil.  
In this environment, China’s fears of  energy insecurity peak with the 
specter of  Sino-American tension and conflict leading to a disruption in 
its oil imports, the most extreme form 
of  which would be a U.S. blockade of  
China’s oil imports from the Middle East. 
Fear of  such a worst-case scenario has 
the potential to negatively influence the 
direction of  China’s policies in pursuit of  
energy resources around the globe and its 
measures and means of  protecting those 
interests.  Some analysts, in both China 
and the United States have suggested that 
such fears may warrant (and trigger) a rapid 
naval build up by China.2  Others see these emerging trends as driving China’s 
efforts to reshape regional relations to its strategic advantage, and even to 
the exclusion of  the United States.3  Neither outcome would stabilize the 
security environment in the region nor be in the interest of  the United States. 
Therefore, it is crucial to assess both the plausibility of  such a blockade and 
its potential effects on China’s economy if  it were to occur.
In the analysis that follows, two essential points are brought to light. The 
first examines the background and justification for China’s fears of  a U.S. em-
bargo or blockade. Unfortunately, China’s anxiety over the possibility of  such 
an incident occurring is not entirely misplaced. Despite a cause for concern, 
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this paper also shows the unlikelihood of  an American blockade on China’s oil 
imports from the Middle East. These conclusions are based both on positive 
and negative factors. On the bright side, the nature of  the international energy 
markets makes such a scenario highly improbable and very problematic to 
execute effectively. More disturbing, but also making a blockade of  any form 
extremely implausible, is the dangerous reality of  China’s likely response were 
it to be attempted. 
An American oil embargo, blockade or other severe disruption to China’s 
energy supply may be remote, yet the psychological impact of  its very pos-
sibility can wreak far more havoc on the nation’s sense of  security. Much 
of  this anxiety stems from the belief  that China’s economy cannot tolerate 
a substantial disruption to its oil supply.  The second point of  analysis of  
this paper attempts to debunk that myth. This is illustrated using two of  the 
worst-case scenarios for Chinese energy security. The first assumes that the 
Saudi regime collapses and the world’s largest exporter of  oil suddenly stops 
exporting.  Some 9 million barrels of  oil daily cease flowing onto the world 
market.  The second scenario features a U.S. military blockade that severely 
staunches the flow of  oil imports from the Middle East into China.  China 
is deprived of  over 2 million barrels of  oil daily from the Gulf, representing 
about 60 percent of  its normal daily imports, and one-third of  its total oil 
consumption. 
Oil Anxiety in Asia
The backdrop of  current oil anxiety is the pervasive fear, especially pro-
nounced in Asia, that world oil production cannot keep pace with soaring 
world demand.  Interestingly, the most authoritative projections of  world 
energy supply and demand do not justify this pessimism.  On the contrary, 
mainstream assessments tend to project macro-stability over the next 20 years 
and beyond.  While acknowledging the wide latitude for short-term price vola-
tility and swings in energy demand and supply, the overall long-term outlook 
is sanguine.  As Figure 1 shows, they portray the future world of  oil as one of  
almost perfect balance and harmony between production and consumption.
Oil prices generally remain inside their historical band in constant dollar 
terms, and supply keeps pace with demand, largely thanks to increasing capac-
ity in the Middle East.  The picture is one of  general equilibrium in spite of  
world oil demand increasing inexorably by 2 percent each year.  This optimism 
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may of  course be misplaced.  Pessimism and anxiety over shrinking reserves 
(“peak oil” theory) have been spreading through the ranks of  oil watchers in 
recent years.  A gloomy fatalism appears to be descending on a widening circle 
of  oil forecasters around the globe.
Whether or not oil production will be technically adequate to meet growing 
consumption for the indefinite future, the specter of  geopolitical upheaval se-
verely disrupting the flow of  oil cannot be dismissed.  The recent disruptions 
in Indonesia, Venezuela, and Nigeria were hiccups compared to the havoc 
that may be wreaked on the oil trade at any time in the Middle East.  This 
epicenter of  geopolitical turmoil keeps world energy security at perpetual risk. 
Arab states declared an oil embargo in 1967 and the OPEC cartel has acted 
twice in recent history (1973 and 1980) to cut oil production and raise prices. 
The global repercussion of  the price shock in latter instances was a massive 
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recession in the industrial world, a history lesson that is not lost on Chinese 
energy planners.  Oil is the most political commodity in the energy basket, 
and is unique in that only oil has experienced deliberate supply interruptions 
and price spiking in the international arena. 5 Although OPEC has lost some 
of  its former clout as non-OPEC production has greatly increased in the last 
two decades, the cartel still wields considerable power over oil supplies and 
pricing.
China’s (and the world’s) anxiety about its growing dependence on Middle 
East oil is especially acute in view of  the emergent threats to the stability of  oil 
exports from the region:  U.S. military dominance in critical energy hotspots6, 
and in China’s perception, the resulting American unilateralism that makes it 
prone to coerce by force, the chronic civil 
strife in post-war Iraq, the rise of  terrorism 
and sabotage, and the constant danger of  
violence spilling over from the Arab-Israeli 
dispute.7   Many of  these threats to the 
flow of  oil exports to China stem directly 
or indirectly from the vigorous assertion of  
American primacy and the militarization of  
U.S. foreign policy in the region (and world).8  Much of  the turmoil in the global 
energy market that unsettles China is the result of  American intervention into 
the heart of  the global oil production system.  Chinese security specialists 
understandably extrapolate this American history to the Asian context, and 
pose the next logical question: might the United States someday intentionally 
intervene into the heart of  China’s oil import network?    
China’s Fear of  U.S. Oil Manipulation
The U.S. is identified by Chinese analysts as the most important external 
force impacting China’s maritime security interests, which not only include 
Taiwan, the East China Sea and South China Sea, but also China’s sea-lane 
security.9 China is casting an especially wary eye at the U.S. role in its energy 
future, for reasons partly related to the strong bilateral alliance between the 
United States and China’s chief  rival in the tightening oil competition – Japan, 
but mainly related to America’s ties with Taiwan.  On the Taiwan question, 
the interests of  China and the United States sharply diverge, and China ex-
pects the United States to exert oil pressure on China to protect its Taiwan 
The future world of  oil as one 
of  almost perfect balance and 
harmony between production 
and consumption.
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interests in extreme circumstances.  If  the history of  U.S. oil diplomacy is any 
indication, the Chinese have cause for concern.  The historical record reveals 
an American proclivity to embrace oil sanctions and blockades in exercising 
coercive diplomacy.
During the early Cold War years, the United States planned to counter 
a Soviet invasion of  oil kingdoms in the Middle East by blowing up the 
region’s oil wells and facilities.10   U.S. defense planners even considered a 
plan to contaminate the oil fields with radioactive materials (“dirty bombs”) 
in order to deny the Soviet Union the petro-wealth and power it would oth-
erwise acquire by occupying the region.11   The emphasis of  its plans has 
been to deny oil to adversaries to prevent them from getting any stronger, 
rather than securing the oil for U.S. consumption.  Denial and coercion have 
been the hallmarks of  U.S. oil strategy toward adversaries.  More recently, the 
United States exhibited its inclination to staunch the flow of  oil during the 
embargo of  Saddam Hussein’s oil exports 
from Iraq, the planned oil blockade of  
the former Yugoslavia in 1999 during the 
Balkans conflict, the serious consideration 
given to imposing an oil embargo on North 
Korea in 1994, and the tacit threats to block 
China’s importation of  oil during a conflict 
over Taiwan.  To some extent China’s own 
experience in applying or suffering oil coercion or manipulation in relations 
with North Korea, Japan, and Russia magnifies its fear of  future U.S. oil pres-
sure.12   (China shut an oil pipeline to North Korea for a few days in 2003 to 
express its dissatisfaction with North Korea’s nuclear weapons policy.)
Whether exaggerated or not, the specter of  the United States coaxing 
Persian Gulf  oil producing states to reduce supplies to China, or even turn-
ing back supertankers laden with petroleum enroute to China, is taken very 
seriously by some Chinese strategic analysts.13   China’s lack of  a significant 
strategic reserve (7 days worth versus Japan’s 100-day reserve14 ) magnifies its 
sense of  vulnerability.  The various speculated purposes served by strangling 
China’s oil inflow include dissuading China from blockading Taiwan; force-
fully reunifying Taiwan with the mainland; containing China’s expansion of  
its regional power; stunting its economic growth; and deterring or retaliating 
for any and all imaginable acts of  Chinese belligerence that endanger vital 
American interests.
China’s own experience in 
applying or suffering oil 
coercion or manipulation 
magnifies its fear of  future 
U.S. oil pressure.
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Oil Blockade: U.S. Assumptions
Lending a degree of  plausibility to the scenario of  a U.S. blockade of  China’s 
oil imports from the Persian Gulf  is the fact that the U.S. Navy believes it may 
possess the wherewithal to enforce an ironclad blockade with near impunity. 
The U.S. Navy operating in the Strait of  Malacca, as well as other strategic 
chokepoints such as the Straits of  Hormuz, controls the entire oil delivery 
route from the Middle East to Asia and could quickly turn off  the spigot 
supplying China.  In the opinion of  certain U.S. senior naval combatant com-
manders responsible for the Pacific zone, a blockade against China would not 
necessarily cause enormous collateral damage to U.S. allies in North East Asia 
such as Japan.15   The United States, they believe, could impose a blockade 
on oil tankers bound for China without constricting oil bound for U.S. allies 
along the Pacific Rim.16   It could carry out the maritime intercept operations 
that had been routinely conducted since 1990 in the Persian Gulf  to enforce 
the embargo on Iraq’s oil exports.  In such operations a U.S. military heli-
copter dispatched from a Navy ship lands on the tanker, inspects the cargo 
papers in the pilot house, and instructs the captain either to proceed or turn 
back. With armed U.S. naval ships standing by, compliance has been practi-
cally universal, except for the occasional North Korean ship that attempted 
to flee the scene.  Such concerns are more than empty speculation. In 1993, 
the U.S. Navy stopped and inspected a Chinese container ship suspected of  
transporting “sensitive material” to Iran.17   It is believed by the U.S. military 
these same well-honed U.S. naval skills could be applied around the vital oil 
chokepoints to screen out supertankers heading toward China while allowing 
passage to those headed for other Pacific Rim destinations.
Despite China’s double-digit (13 percent average) defense spending in-
creases over the past 10 years and its impressive military build-up, the United 
States believes its sword of  Damocles hanging over China’s energy security 
will remain in place for many decades to come.  While seeking to diversify 
its sources of  oil imports and building overland pipelines to channel more 
oil into safer routes, China will scarcely reduce its dependency on Middle 
East oil or its exposure to an oil blockade, and neutralizing the U.S. capability 
to threaten this lifeline is not becoming any more feasible.  China will be 
tempted, and indeed is already trying to acquire military capabilities to project 
enough military power over the vital oil sea lanes to counter the U.S. sword. 
China has been allowed by various nations along the oil sea arteries from 
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Hormuz to Malacca to establish coastal intelligence and military outposts in 
order to monitor the routes and support Chinese naval operations aimed at 
protecting the lifeline, such as escorting 
China-bound oil tankers.18   But according 
to knowledgeable U.S. military experts, 
China could not prevent the United States 
from cutting this vital artery. 19  It is orders 
of  magnitude more difficult to protect the 
sea lines than it is to disrupt them. In their 
view, there is no realistic prospect that China will acquire the long-range sea 
control capabilities needed to ensure that oil tankers bound for Chinese ports 
could run the gauntlet.20  If  such assessments are valid, the United States 
holds the key to Chinese access to oil from the Middle East.
In addition, under the above analysis, China could not implement an effec-
tive counter-blockade with a view to preventing Persian Gulf  oil from reach-
ing U.S. allies in the Pacific region.  China lacks any ability to enforce a surface 
embargo, and therefore could not distinguish ‘friend from foe’, identify the 
tankers’ “nationality” and destinations, and otherwise apply force selectively. 
China would thus have to resort to indiscriminant attacks on shipping using 
torpedoes and mines, thereby risking conflict with others in the region and 
beyond. These attacks would be carried out largely by China’s submarine fleet, 
which would doubtless manage to randomly sink some vessels in the style of  
German U-boat operations against British ships in World War I.  But China 
would have to declare a complete embargo of  Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 
and risk sinking the ships of  any of  scores of  shipping nations.  (China also 
relies on foreign shipping for more than 90 percent of  its sea-based com-
merce.)  Besides the complication of  legality under international law, such 
indiscriminant attacks would not score many hits and the operation could not 
be sustained very long by the current Chinese submarine force.21 
China’s Response
Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s bold claim in 1951 that the United States con-
trols the shores of  Asia, has never been forgotten or underestimated by the 
PLA Navy (PLAN).22  Neither has this reality of  half  a century ago been felt 
more acutely by China than it does today.  Chinese analysts clearly recognize 
The United States holds the 
key to Chinese access to oil 
from the Middle East.
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the vulnerability of  the nation’s oil transportation routes by a U.S.-enforced 
blockade in the scenario of  a conflict over Taiwan.23  China has offered no 
official explanation of  its position if  confronted by such circumstances. 
However, many Chinese analysts believe that any such blockade would be 
highly unfeasible because of  its dubious legality in international law.24  Others 
reject its plausibility on the grounds that regional states, including the littoral 
Malacca Strait nations, would not cooperate with the United States. However, 
the unofficial opinions of  both Chinese military analysts and energy experts 
are nearly unanimous in their conclusion that a U.S. blockade of  China’s oil 
would be tantamount to war. 
In terms of  conventional means, China has acquired technological prowess 
with its intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles, which are equipped 
with precision guidance and pose threats to U.S. bases as far away as Japan 
and Guam. The threat this would pose has 
been questioned by American military as-
sessments, especially if  considered under a 
fundamental assumption of  a limited con-
flict. Active U.S. and allied missile defenses 
(surface-to-air defenses) coupled with pas-
sive defenses (such as rapid runway repair 
capabilities) would limit the amount of  
damage and ensure that U.S. bases returned 
to operational status in short order. In ad-
dition, U.S. military responses could span 
the full spectrum from attacking similar facilities throughout China to seizing 
the Chinese islands in the South China Sea. Chinese missile strikes against 
U.S. bases, especially in Japan, would also likely trigger Japan’s full support of  
the United States in the defense of  Taiwan entailing the full participation of  
Japan’s superb air and naval forces in the fight. 
While China may not have the capability to selectively counter a blockade 
by the United States and still contain the conflict, it would certainly possess 
options to retaliate and escalate the conflagration if  it felt pressured to raise 
the stakes.25  Because China would lack the naval power to effectively break 
a blockade, let alone enforce control of  its sea lines of  communication, 
retaliation would more likely be the targeting of  other areas of  transporta-
tion freedom against the Unites States.26  Moreover, the doctrine of  PLAN 
There is no natural firebreak 
in a conceivable conflict and 
escalatory updrafts would 
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counter-move, beginning with 
any oil blockade and possibly 
ending in nuclear disaster. 
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explained by the former commander of  PLAN indicates that China will not 
only counterattack, but escalate in naval warfare: “When enemies attack our 
coastlines, we will attack our enemies’ home base.”27  
The likelihood of  escalation is important because a piecemeal oil blockade 
is unlikely as China would not conceivably limit its counter-measures if  it is on 
the losing side of  such a conflict. Any blockade is more likely to accompany 
a larger military campaign, in which case a complete obstruction of  all ship-
ping would occur naturally as civilian supertankers would stay far away from 
the zone of  conflict after the combat begins. By this stage of  the contest, 
the stakes would become far greater than oil alone. Indiscriminate counter-
measures would halt China’s own energy imports and its large overseas trade 
volume, but it would also stop all shipping to the rest of  North East Asia, a 
situation that would plunge the world economy into chaos (Japan would be 
especially vulnerable as it is over 90 percent dependent on oil imports and 
approximately 20 percent of  its economy is dependent on foreign trade). The 
potential damage would be so devastating to the global economy it makes for 
an almost impossibly remote scenario.
An even more dangerous dynamic could easily come into play involving 
hard-nosed major powers with nuclear weapons in their arsenals. The nature 
of  such a scenario would obviously depend greatly on the cause and condi-
tions of  the conflict but there is no natural firebreak in a conceivable conflict 
and escalatory updrafts would accompany each move and counter-move, 
beginning with an oil blockade and possibly ending in nuclear disaster. 
International Markets: First Line of  Defense
China’s vulnerability to oil supply disruptions and price shocks obviously 
depends on the scenario.  The circumstances could vary enormously.  As recent 
events have demonstrated, price spikes may result from isolated incidents that 
carry weighty implications, such as recent terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia that 
undermined confidence in the country’s political stability.  Such events also 
prove that energy insecurity is as much a psychological as a physical condition. 
The psychological impact on oil prices is often far greater than any physical 
consequence.  The mere fear of  the demise of  the Saudi regime leading to 
supply disruption raised prices.  The mere fear that Yukos oil would stop 
flowing in the midst of  its tax dispute with the Kremlin caused a significant oil 
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spike in the international oil market.  These fears translate into an “oil security 
premium” that has been running as high as $10 to $25 a barrel.28   Similarly, 
it is Asia’s relatively greater fear of  oil supply disruption, a fear rooted in its 
greater dependency on imports (relative to Europe or North America), that 
Middle Eastern producers can and do exploit by charging an extra $2 per 
barrel to Asian customers.
Terrorism or inter-state conflict in the region may of  course physically 
damage key oil facilities and significantly disrupt the production and trans-
portation of  oil, resulting in a price hike, as happened during the two Gulf  
wars.  The same applies to terrorist assaults on oil shipping.  An oil importer’s 
nightmare is the terrorist sinking of  a ship that obstructs a vital chokepoint 
such as the Malacca or Hormuz straits.  The frequency of  terrorist attacks on 
Middle Eastern oil pipelines, facilities, ports, and transportation vessels has 
increased sharply in recent years.  Piracy on the high seas, particularly in the 
southern South China Sea that abuts the oil sea routes, is often put into this 
category although so far ship hijacking or sinking by pirates has been rare 
– at-sea “mugging” is the usual crime committed by pirates.
The largest supply disruptions in modern history, as mentioned earlier, 
have been the deliberate decisions of  the OPEC cartel.  China understandably 
worries that OPEC might again brandish its oil power through production 
cuts and embargoes in a bid to shape the behavior of  oil-consuming nations 
embroiled in some conflict in which OPEC has a vital stake. The major impact 
would be a sharp rise in world oil prices for 
everyone.  Although hypothetically China 
could be selectively embargoed by OPEC 
under pressure from the United States, the 
feasibility of  enforcing it would be slim to 
nil.  The world market is so seamless that oil 
supplies can be obtained from non-embar-
goed sources, at the same (albeit inflated) 
price that everyone pays.  This is what happened during the great oil embargo 
of  1973 declared by OPEC against the United States.  Prices skyrocketed 
because of  the large production cutback, but OPEC could not prevent non-
embargoed nations from selling oil to the United States.  The embargo was 
little more than a symbolic gesture, although the cut-back in production by 
OPEC spread price pain everywhere and led to a global recession.
China’s exposure to oil price 
shock caused by supply 
disruptions is thus exactly 
equal to America’s exposure.
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Oil producing fiefdoms in the Middle East have far less latitude today to 
brandish the oil sword against thirsty consumers.  It is often overlooked that 
they simply cannot afford to stop selling oil on the world market, lest their 
own oil-export-dependent economies collapse.  The world’s largest exporter 
by far, Saudi Arabia, for example, cannot stop pumping oil without shattering 
its fragile social contract with its own population.  The House of  Saud has 
suffered nearly two decades of  large budget and trade deficits and amassed a 
debt of  nearly 75 percent of  Saudi annual gross domestic product.  Revenue 
from oil exports has dropped sharply in real dollar terms since the 1970s, and 
a surging youth population and high unemployment (14 percent or greater) 
has resulted in a plunge in per capita oil earnings (over $22,000 in the late 
1970s versus $4,500 today, in constant 2004 dollars).29   With its social wel-
fare system on thin ice, Saudi Arabia needs its consumers as much as they 
need Saudi crude.  While China and other importers may feel vulnerable to 
Middle Eastern oil diplomacy, the dependencies are mutual.  The oil pro-
duction and consumption network is a perfect example of  global economic 
interdependence.  
The global integrated marketplace is thus a soft cushion against embargo 
pressures.  It has spontaneously eliminated the ability of  any state or cartel 
(like OPEC) to effectively enforce an oil embargo on any other nation, includ-
ing China, unless an embargo is accompanied by physical enforcement, which 
is beyond their ability.  The sole exception is the United States.  Short of  a 
physical blockade or embargo, which only the United States could impose, no 
sanction can effectively constrict the flow of  oil around the world.  Although 
any production cut-backs accompanying an embargo would raise world prices 
for everyone, it is the price mechanism, not physical mechanisms that would 
ration the allocation of  oil.30 
China’s exposure to oil price shock caused by supply disruptions is thus 
exactly equal to America’s exposure, and to all other nations around the globe 
regardless of  their dependence on oil imports.  The exposure is the same 
for nations that import all of  their oil, such as Japan, as it is for nations that 
produce more oil than it needs, such as Britain.  Britain’s self-sufficiency in 
oil did nothing to shield British consumers from the sudden spike in gasoline 
prices in the summer of  2000.  In the world oil market it does not matter 
how much energy a nation produces domestically or buys from abroad.  The 
domestic oil producers follow the money (i.e., their economic interests).  They 
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are not going to sell their gasoline at home for lower prices than they can get 
from foreign buyers, unless of  course they are domestically regulated by price 
controls.  Such are the laws of  the global marketplace.
In the case of  China, however, its domestic energy scene is not yet well 
integrated into the world market and is subject to various state-governed 
regulations.  Chinese consumers are shielded more than modern industrial 
nation’s consumers from price shocks in the 
world oil markets, but China as a nation is 
not shielded any more or less than other na-
tions from the cost of  importing oil.  At the 
current import level, every dollar increase 
per unit will lead to $1 billion of  new cost to 
China on oil imports a year.  China paid a $15 
billion more for oil imports because of  price 
hikes in 2005 than it paid in 2004.31    China 
would join the crowd of  nations spending 
larger sums of  cash on oil, and would reduce its consumption and its gross 
domestic product proportionately to its reduced consumption.32 
These laws generally transcend geopolitics.  During the Cold War, oil and 
gas flowed freely between nations practically irrespective of  their nuclear su-
perpower associations.  Today, the United States directly or indirectly imports 
oil from the pariah states on its sanctions list – Iran and Libya, for example. 
Despite severe strains in relations between Venezuela and the United States, 
the former exports most of  its oil to the latter.  It politically prefers to export 
to China, which shares the sentiment, but the transportation costs make 
it uneconomical.  Similarly, China has gone on a deal-making spree for oil 
commitments from nations around the world regardless of  their political and 
ideological coloration.  During the Cold War China applied a political litmus 
test in forging economic partnerships with other countries; the relations of  
those countries with the United States or the Soviet Union weighed heavily in 
China’s consideration.  Today China’s economic interests outweigh all other 
considerations.  
In sum, suppliers in the world oil market follow their economic interests. 
The key issue is not whether global oil reserves are “peaking”, or how much 
oil is produced domestically, or how much is bought from particular coun-
tries, or whether sanctions and embargoes have been declared.  With the sole 
With the sole exception of  
the “outlier” case of  an oil 
blockade imposed on China 
by the United States, the 
key issue in China’s energy 
security is prices.
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exception of  the “outlier” case of  an oil blockade imposed on China by the 
United States, the key issue in China’s energy security is prices.  Its energy 
vulnerability depends on the price of  energy in general, and the price of  a 
barrel of  oil on the world market in particular.  The price of  oil substitutes, 
such as gas, is also central to China’s energy security.  Gas prices will figure 
increasingly prominently into the equation within five years because a world 
gas market similar to the world oil market will emerge in this time frame.  Gas 
can be substituted for oil in many areas and the maturing of  the world gas 
market will enhance China’s agility in adapting to oil supply disruptions.  But 
even so the price of  oil will remain the central question of  China’s future 
energy security.
Scenario 1: Saudi Oil Disruption
The nature of  international markets, therefore, makes for a considerable 
buffer against any disruption to global oil supply. In addition, as we have seen, 
the blockade of  energy imports to China by the United States is a distant pos-
sibility.  Yet, even a remote chance of  such an incident happening has rightly 
planted a seed of  fear for many Chinese strategists when considering China’s 
overall energy security. Such fears are often blown out of  proportion, and have 
the potential of  engendering adverse affects on strategic policymaking. Hence, 
assessing the impact of  an oil supply disruption on China’s economy serves to 
put into perspective the real threat to the nation’s economic stability. 
While calculating such economic affects of  energy supply interruption is 
an inexact science, rough estimates may be derived from available data on 
China’s overall energy consumption, total 
oil consumption, the amount of  energy 
used to produce $1 of  GDP, the capacity 
to substitute coal or gas for oil, and as-
sumptions about the amount and duration 
of  the oil disruption.
We consider two scenarios.  The first 
scenario assumes that all of  the oil exports 
of  Saudi Arabia suddenly disappear from the world market.  For current pur-
poses it is immaterial whether this disruption is the result of  a Saudi embargo, 
nuclear terrorism against the Saudi oil complex, revolutionary regime change, 
Assessing the impact of  an oil 
supply disruption on China’s 
economy serves to put into 
perspective the real threat to 
the nation’s economic stability.
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or other causes.  The second scenario assumes an oil blockade is imposed on 
China by the United States during a confrontation.
In the case of  Saudi oil disruption, estimated Saudi daily exports for the 
notional period (2005 timeframe) are 8.7 million barrels per day.33   The sudden 
cessation of  this flow reduces the world oil supply by that same amount until 
other oil producers ramp up their output to compensate for the Saudi loss, or 
until nations start drawing on government reserves which in effect increases 
available world supply.  Saudi Arabia, however, is the only oil producer with 
excess oil production capacity (normally about 2 million barrels per day surge 
capacity) at the present time.  Since Saudi Arabia is shut down in this scenario 
and cannot offset its own supply disruption, any offsetting surge in supply 
must come from withdrawals from strategic petroleum reserves of  the United 
States and other nations.  Assuming these reserves are immediately tapped 
at a daily rate of  1.2 million barrels per day, the net world loss due to Saudi 
paralysis is reduced to 7.5 million barrels per day.
Given that world oil production in the notional period is 83.8 million bar-
rels per day, the loss of  7.5 million barrels represents a reduction of  9 percent 
of  global supplies.  As an immediate consequence, the price of  a barrel on 
the world market doubles or triples, depending on the price elasticity of  oil. 
Recent Rand and Brookings studies assume an initial elasticity of  0.10 and 
0.05, respectively.34   According to the U.S. Department of  Energy, the elastic-
ity in world oil markets varies according to the initial baseline price.35   At a 
notional baseline price of  $35 per barrel, and using the Energy Department’s 
formulas, we estimate the price elasticity to be 0.075, which lies exactly at 
the mid-point between the Rand and Brookings assumptions.  In the current 
psychological climate of  oil scarcity, however, we do find the more inelastic 
lower number of  0.05 to be quite plausible, and therefore have assumed that 
elasticity lies between 0.05 and 0.075.  (Price elasticity refers to the percentage 
change in price that results from a 1 percent change in supply; to illustrate, 
an assumed elasticity of  0.05 means that a 1 percent cut in supply causes a 20 
percent increase in price, and by the same token a 1 percent increase in supply 
leads to a 20 percent decrease in price.)
A 9 percent reduction in world supply translates into a price increase of  
120 to 180 percent, assuming elasticities of  0.075 and 0.05, respectively.  The 
new price of  a barrel of  oil rises to between $77 to $98 dollars, respectively. 
This price shock then weakens the Chinese economy in two fundamental 
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ways.  Economists refer to these mechanisms as the real-income effect and 
the business-cycle effect.36   The former captures the additional cost of  im-
ported oil resulting from the price spike, and adds to this extra expenditure the 
adverse affect on productivity resulting from businesses having to substitute 
other inputs for the lost oil.  The business-cycle effect captures the higher 
unemployment and lower spending caused by higher oil prices, which may 
lead to a major recession if  the inflationary pressure of  higher oil prices leads 
governments to tighten monetary policy and raise interest rates.37   Much of  
the adverse effect, in other words, may stem from government interventions 
rather than from the direct effects on the cost of  business operations.
These mechanisms work differently in China than in market economies like 
the United States, and in the Chinese case we could not find or create a good 
model of  them.  In both cases, simple correlations between oil price hikes 
and gross domestic product have been empirically derived by economists and 
suffice for our purposes.  According to a study carried out by China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which are used in the calculations below, 
statistics between 1993 and 2000 show that a 1 percent rise in world oil prices 
would decrease Chinese GDP growth by 0.01 percent.38  (A more recent study 
by the Chinese Academy of  Sciences shows an even smaller economic impact 
with increasing oil prices.39  See Appendix A for the two reference points.) 
Therefore, according to the CNPC study, a price increase of  120 to 180 per-
cent would be expected to reduce GDP by 1.2 to 1.8 percent.  (Interestingly, 
the U.S. Department of  Energy’s rule-of-thumb formula is identical for the 
second year of  a price spike – U.S. GDP would decline 1.2 to 1.8 percent in 
the second year, but only 0.6 to 0.9 percent in the first year.)40 
To validate these estimates for the Chinese case, we applied a somewhat 
more sophisticated model of  the impact of  the oil shock on China’s economy. 
We: (1) calculated the amount of  reduced oil consumption that would result 
from the oil price hike; (2) calculated the corresponding amount of  reduced 
energy consumption (in units of  thermal energy) for the year; (3) divided 
the energy consumption reduction by the energy intensity quotient for China 
(energy intensity is the amount of  energy in units of  thermal energy expended 
in generating one dollar of  GDP) to yield the total dollar amount of  GDP 
reduction for the year; and (4) divided the total dollar GDP reduction by the 
baseline total dollar GDP projected for the year in the absence of  any oil 
shock.41   Using reliable data published by the U.S. Department of  Energy and 
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by a U.S. Congress Commission report,42  we estimate that the hypothesized 
scenario would lead to a decline of  1.47 to 2.93 percent of  GDP.  In simple 
algebraic steps, we derived this estimate as follows (see Appendix B for an 
advanced mathematical expression of  the relationship between reduced oil 
supply and reduced GDP):
1. The oil price hike as calculated earlier would reduce China’s oil con-
sumption by 630,000 barrels per day (it is interesting to note the real-world 
statistic that in 2005 China expected to import 310,000 barrels per day from 
Saudi Arabia) because of  a 9 percent reduction in China’s regular consump-
tion of  7 million barrels of  oil per day.
2. The corresponding amount of  reduced annual energy consumption 
equals 1.35 quadrillion Btu (630,000 barrels times 365 days/year times 5.879 
million Btu/barrel).
3. The corresponding reduction of  annual GDP equals $50 billion (1.35 
quadrillion Btu divided by 27.000 Btu – the amount of  thermal units expended 
in generating one dollar of  GDP in 1997 constant dollars).
4. We calculated the percentage reduction of  China’s GDP at 2.93 per-
cent ($50 billion divided by $1.706 trillion, the total projected GDP for 2005 
in 1997 constant dollars).
5. We assumed that China mitigated the GDP decline by substituting 
coal and gas for some of  the lost oil at a rate proportionate to a 0.02 percent 
cross-elasticity of  fuels, which “softened” the annual GDP decline by about 
half, to 1.47 percent decline instead of  2.93 percent.  However, the current 
breakneck pace of  China’s coal extraction with the industry operating at full 
capacity raises doubts about China’s ability to substitute much coal for oil.43 
Therefore, our estimate of  the adverse impact of  the oil shock on China’s 
GDP lies between 1.47 and 2.93 percent.
This more complex calculation yields a mid-point estimate of  2.2 percent 
GDP decline, compared to the earlier calculations based on simple rules-of-
thumb that yielded a mid-point estimate of  1.5 percent GDP decline.  The 
average of  these two mid-points is 1.85 percent annual GDP decline.  China’s 
economic growth would thus contract from the notional level of  9.5 percent 
annual growth (2005 timeframe) to 7.65 percent growth, which is still roughly 
double the U.S. economic growth rate.  The cost to China of  this drop in eco-
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nomic output would be about $32 billion.  In addition, China’s import oil bill 
would double or triple; the higher price of  oil ($77 to $98 per barrel instead 
of  the baseline $35) would add another $25 to $38 billion to the overall blow 
to the economy.  (This calculation assumes that baseline net oil imports of  2.3 
million barrels per days would be reduced by 630,000 barrels per day; China 
would pay an extra $42 to $63 dollars for each of  the 1.67 million barrels of  
oil imported each day.)  The extra cost of  oil would roughly cancel out China’s 
typical current account surplus.
In sum, the sudden cessation of  Saudi oil exports would cost the world a 
bundle, and China’s share of  the pain would amount to approximately $57 
billion to $70 billion dollars for 2005.  Larger economies such as the U.S. 
economy would suffer comparably in GDP terms, and far more in absolute 
dollar terms.  (The U.S. oil import bill increase would be quadruple China’s 
sticker shock, but the recessionary effects might be weaker owing to the sev-
eral-fold higher efficiency of  U.S. energy consumption compared to China.) 
Without minimizing the economic adversity caused by this oil shock to China’s 
system, and the possible domestic political fall-out from a slow-down, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that China’s economy would remain healthy.  China’s 
economic growth would still exceed the 5 percent annual GDP growth rate 
needed to absorb its still expanding labor pool and thereby stave off  social 
instability caused by widespread unemployment.
Scenario 2: U.S. Oil Blockade from Middle East
It is commonly held that a U.S. blockade of  oil imports to China would flat-
ten China’s upward economic trajectory or, worse yet, throw the country into 
a deep recession.  A rigorous assessment would have to weigh a plethora of  
factors ranging from the scale and duration of  the blockade to the availability 
of  suitable energy substitutes for oil.  In this case, however, the context of  
the scenario is especially pertinent to the analysis.  In our judgment, as argued 
earlier, an oil blockade is not likely to be undertaken as an opening gambit in 
a test of  nerves over Taiwan or some other vital interest.  As discussed previ-
ously, this would be an incendiary act that in all likelihood would escalate a 
diplomatic crisis into a military conflict. For the sake of  argument, this section 
will assume an isolated partial oil blockade on China and estimate its impact 
on the economy. 
In this scenario, we assume that the U.S. Navy polices the key chokepoints 
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along the supertanker routes to China in order to deny passage to vessels 
bound for China from the Persian Gulf.   In the notional timeframe (2005), 
the amount of  oil delivered daily to China from Gulf  sources is estimated to 
exceed 2.3 million barrels per day, which represents 60 percent of  total China 
oil imports.  The largest suppliers are Iran and Saudi Arabia at about 400,000 
and 300,000 barrels, respectively.  Oman and Sudan, though not technically 
considered Persian Gulf  countries, export about 350,000 and 175,000 barrels, 
respectively.
This partial blockade does not reduce the world oil supply except to China. 
In theory, prices would actually drop considerably as 2.3 million barrels of  
oil return to the world supply after failing to reach their intended destination. 
Assuming price elasticity of  0.05 to 0.075, the surplus would drive the price 
of  a barrel of  oil down from $35 (notional baseline price) to between $14 and 
$21.44   This blockade bonus would be enjoyed even by China as cheaper oil 
found its way into its import stream, albeit a stream that has contracted by 
some 60 percent of  its original flow.
The simple formula applied earlier (scenario A) can be used to show the 
positive effect on China’s GDP of  the lower prices for 40 percent of  its oil 
imports.  Basically, the Chinese economy would be boosted by 0.16 to 0.24 
percent GDP growth (0.4 times 0.4 to 0.6 percent), or roughly $4 billion 
per year.  And China would save a bundle (about $9.5 billion per annum) by 
buying its allowed quota of  1.5 million daily barrels of  imported oil at lower 
prices. 
The negative side of  the ledger suggests acute duress, however.  The block-
ade deprives China of  60 percent of  its normal oil imports, and one third 
of  its total oil consumption.  Using the complex formula applied earlier, we 
estimate that China’s GDP would plunge by 5.4 to 10.8 percent, depending on 
China’s capacity to accelerate coal mining and gas extraction.  Assuming the 
mid-point of  this range is the actual amount of  the decline, then China’s GDP 
drops by 8.1 percent for 2005, practically wiping out the predicted growth rate 
of  9.5 percent.  The dollar amount of  the loss of  growth is roughly $183 
billion, which improves to about $170 billion after adjusting for the small 
gains described above that accrued as a result of  the cheaper oil prices on the 
limited Chinese imports.
This blow to the Chinese economy would clearly be quite severe and it 
would threaten its long-term health.  Viewed through a conventional macro-
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economic prism, such a recession would be doubly painful for a nation whose 
growing labor pool demands continuing high GDP growth to avoid high rates 
of  unemployment.  But of  course the context of  this scenario, a conflict with 
the United States involving an oil blockade, would brush aside this conven-
tional economic analysis as other structural shifts take place during a national 
security emergency.  Oil price and energy consumption elasticity coefficients 
might change in unexpected ways if  the Chinese economy shifted to a war 
footing. 
Implications for China
The Chinese economy is more resilient to oil price shocks caused by supply 
disruptions than may be commonly believed.  In the event of  the sudden and 
total disappearance of  Saudi oil from the global supply, the adverse impact of  
the resulting price spike on China’s economy would not be severe.  The net 
world loss of  oil supplies due to Saudi paralysis would represent 9 percent of  
global supply, triggering a tripling of  the world price, but by our calculations 
China’s annual GDP would decline by less than 2 percent.  China could easily 
ride out this disturbance.  (China could even more easily ride out an Iranian 
decision to make good on its threat to stop exporting oil in retaliation for 
world pressure to end its nuclear program; Iran’s daily export is less than 
one-half  of  Saudi Arabia’s.)
China’s energy security planners may be further comforted by our argu-
ment that no plausible scenarios exist in which China can be deprived of  its 
Middle East oil imports by an embargo or production cut.  One reason is that 
the OPEC cartel cannot wield its oil power 
the way it once did, because of  its loss of  
market share to non-OPEC competition, 
and also because the oil fiefdoms simply 
cannot afford to stop selling oil on the 
world market.  It would be domestically 
suicidal for them to do so.  In any case, 
China could not be selectively embargoed 
by OPEC or anyone else because of  the 
infeasibility of  enforcing it.  And the price mechanism, not physical mecha-
nisms, would ration the allocation of  oil in circumstances of  embargoes and 
production cuts.
If  Saudi oil  disappeared from 
the global supply, the adverse 
impact of  the resulting price 
spike on China’s economy 
would not be severe.
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The one exception to this point is the case of  an oil blockade imposed on 
China by the United States, an implausible scenario for political reasons.  To be 
sure, plans for blockading Chinese oil imports in response to an unprovoked 
Chinese attack on Taiwan have surely been drawn up in the Pentagon, and the 
U.S. Navy could conceivably turn back super tankers laden with petroleum 
enroute to China during a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan.  And on 
paper such a blockade would bring Chinese economic growth to a standstill. 
By our calculations, such a blockade would deprive China of  about 2.3 million 
barrels of  Gulf  oil daily, representing about 60 percent of  China’s normal 
import level and one-third of  its total oil consumption, and wipe out over 8 
percent of  China’s annual GDP growth for the notional year (2005).
As this paper shows however, the stakes would be far greater than oil and 
GDP growth in such circumstances.  Escalation all the way up the ladder to 
nuclear disaster would hang over any Taiwan crisis.  Therefore an oil blockade 
is not likely to ever be undertaken as an opening gambit in a showdown over 
Taiwan, or for that matter, over any other vital U.S. interest.  The stakes would 
rapidly transcend energy security, trade, development and economic growth 
– national survival itself  would be the core value at stake.  Chinese security 
planners may confidently discount completely the plausibility of  a deliberate 
U.S. oil blockade under circumstances short of  war.
Managing Energy Geopolitics
Our main conclusion is that geopolitical threats to Chinese energy security 
are manifest only or almost only in price swings that China can readily tolerate. 
Chinese planners should worry less about the geopolitics of  oil and focus on 
conservation, energy efficiency, liberalization of  domestic energy investment 
and markets, and other domestic components of  energy security.  These fac-
tors, especially conservation and efficiency improvements, offer by far the 
most leverage on the challenge. Rigorously implementing such measures, 
all of  which are well within China’s domestic control, will also instill a high 
level of  confidence in the nation’s own capabilities to cope with its energy 
insecurity.
The complex and hazardous geopolitics of  securing oil supply is less within 
China’s grasp, although further steps could and should also be taken to make 
it more manageable.  These are the responsibility of  China, the United States 
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and the Pacific Rim region. Any such measures should address the underlying 
psychological component of  China’s energy insecurity: fear of  an oil blockade 
by the United States, however remote its possibility. To this end, we recom-
mend an energy and maritime security initiative (a Malacca Council) which 
should entail a number of  basic principles. 
From China’s perspective, one framework for membership might be as 
follows. China has demonstrated three tendencies in its recent engagement 
with international organizations: open re-
gionalism that avoids excluding third party 
countries, especially the United States; soft 
regionalism (China feels more comfort-
able participating in rather than leading an 
organization that highlights the presence 
of  multiple Southeast Asian countries); 
peaceful regionalism (no targeting against 
a third country and a focus on non-tradi-
tional security issues).45  Therefore, a viable arrangement for such a body 
would be one composed of  and equally initiated by Northeast Asia’s energy-
dependent, high energy-consuming states, China, Japan, and South Korea, the 
United States and the Malacca states (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia), with an 
open-ended structure to allow other interested nations to join. 
This Malacca Council would be organized primarily as both an economic 
and security forum. All states could either contribute with investment and 
equipment to protecting the Malacca Strait and the sea lines of  communica-
tion or participate in their defense by sending patrol personnel. Core tasks 
would also include consultations and information exchange on counter-piracy 
operations, a collective strategic petroleum reserve, participation in humani-
tarian assistance on the sea in case of  emergency and preventive measures to 
reduce ocean pollution. 
This body would be a new entity, though it should incorporate many of  the 
constructive elements of  current security initiatives. For example, its scope 
could extend beyond strictly energy and maritime concerns to encompass 
other closely relevant non traditional security areas, especially environmental 
issues. A model for this principle could be the Energy, Environment and 
Security in Northeast Asia Project (ESENA), a program which was conceived 
to bring the United States and Japan together to promote environmentally 
Such measures should address 
the underlying psychological 
component of  China’s energy 
insecurity – fear of  oil an 
blockade by the U.S.
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sustainable and secure energy.46  This would provide cross-linkages of  inter-
ests, especially between Japan and China, where accommodation on serious 
environmental concerns would be a strong incentive for cooperation. Such 
a platform could be utilized in a greater political regional context so as to 
enhance prospects for peace.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its close cousins, the Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
are important as models to the extent that they include the United States as 
a central player to regional security and call for collective security coopera-
tion on mutual concerns. But these have largely been unacceptable to many 
interested countries in their present form and function primarily because they 
are seen as dominated by the United States and in the case of  the PSI, directed 
at certain countries, especially North Korea.47  For the Malacca Council to be 
effective, however, it would need to place all the major players on an equal 
footing and not be directed at any one country. The Korean Peninsula nuclear 
crisis and relevant proliferation concerns are certainly large obstacles to ac-
complishing any form of  consensus on regional security issues, but, as some 
have suggested, the six party talks, especially if  successful in resolving that 
crisis, may be a platform to launch the kind of  energy and maritime security 
initiative conceived of  here.48  In addition, while the nuclear crisis is a short to 
medium term contingency, energy security and related geostrategic concerns 
are longer term issues and thus the outcome of  the one may not preclude the 
prospects for the other. 
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy in Asia (ReCAAP) 
probably holds the greatest value as a model for such an energy and maritime 
security mechanism. Being an indigenous pan-Asian initiative it has made some 
very promising steps by dealing with piracy in Southeast Asia and has led to 
greater information sharing amongst member states.49  However, it has been 
criticized for not having strong enforcement authority and member states are 
not bound to comply. In addition, as an initiative originating in Japan, China 
remains apprehensive of  supporting it. Indonesian and Malaysian hesitation 
to ReCAAP also highlights the political sensitivities of  securing agreements 
between the littoral states and other interested parties.50  Most importantly, 
considering that any initiative which effectively addresses American, Chinese 
and other Asia Pacific nations’ security concerns, a Malacca Council will need 
to include the United States as a fully engaged member. 
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Any security arrangement cannot be sustainable without addressing the 
wartime issues. In this case, the shadow of  a potential conflict over Taiwan 
between China and the United States in the West Pacific hangs over the whole 
region. Thus, one further principle would greatly increase the initiative’s 
chances at success.  Under the security arrangement suggested above, we 
recommend a principle designed to prevent any future energy crisis over 
Taiwan.  A security initiative should in essence distinguish between peace 
time measures amongst member states and a ‘no first use’ policy for blockade 
in the contingency of  an armed conflict. ‘No first use’ here refers to the 
following voluntary declaration: not to be the first to use military means to 
blockade or endanger the international shipping lanes, particularly energy 
transportation, in times of  wars or conflict. In such declarations would be the 
explicit understanding that if  any member nation breached this declaration 
and used military means to blockade or endanger another country or region’s 
shipping, the other member states would be released of  their no first use 
obligation and could resort to countermeasures. This would prevent China 
from using blockades against Taiwan, which the United States is concerned 
about but it would also prevent the United States from using oil blockades 
against China. This being the most likely flashpoint for conflict and blockade 
in the West Pacific, the whole region would benefit. This security founda-
tion would greatly increase confidence in the region for introducing various 
cooperative measures in times of  peace. Naturally, the efficacy of  any such 
‘no first use’ policy could be questioned on several grounds, but it would still 
have an important political utility that dissuades participating countries from 
a behavior dangerous to the whole community.  Multilateral naval cooperation 
in particular could not only strengthen crisis management, but also provide 
reassurance that blockade operations could not be suddenly implemented 
without ample advance warning. This would require further strengthening of  
the protocols and mechanisms of  Sino-American crisis management at the 
highest levels of  government.
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Appendix A:
1. CNPC study: This study illustrates the relationship between oil price fluctuation, 
China’s oil imports and change in GDP between the years 1993 and 2000.  For each 1 
percent increase in the world oil price lasting for a year, China’s GDP will be reduced by 
an average of  0.01 percent.  As a measure of  its accuracy, in 1999, while the world oil 
price rose by 10.38 percent, China’s GDP growth sustained a decrease of  0.07 percent. 
In 2000, an increase in oil price of  64 percent led to a reduction in GDP growth of  0.7 
percent. 
2. Study by the Center for Forecasting at the Science of  the Chinese Academy of  Sciences. 
It indicates, for example, that for every 5 percent, 50 percent and 100 percent of  increase 
in world oil price, China’s actual GDP will decrease by 0.029 percent, 0.137 percent and 
0.159 percent, respectively. The study includes a range of  other impacts from the rise 
of  oil prices caused by the decrease in China’s rural and urban residents’ expenditure, to 
China’s total investment and the exchange rate of  the renminbi exchange.
Appendix B:
GDP Decline as a Function of  Global Oil Supply Reduction*
* (The authors wish to thank our colleague Haninah Levine, a science fellow at the 
World Security Institute, for the mathematical derivation given in this appendix.)
The expression below, derived from the simple algebraic steps 1-5 on page 49-50, relates 
GDP decline to oil supply loss:
Where:
%G = percent change in China’s GDP
I = oil intensity of  China’s economy before the oil shock
G = China’s GDP before the oil shock
Sgl = total global oil supply
Coil = China’s consumption of  oil before the oil shock (in Btu/year)
χ  = cross-elasticity of  fuels
E = initial price elasticity of  oil
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Ccoal/gas = China’s total consumption of  coal and gas before the oil shock (in Btu/year)
The derivation of  this expression                                                            ,
from the five steps on page 49-50 is as follows:
1.                        , where Coil = China’s initial consumption of  oil and Sgl = global 
supply of  oil. There is, incidentally, an assumption here that oil shortfall will be equally 
distributed across all consumers, or at least that China’s proportionate shortfall will equal 
the global mean.
2. ∆Ctot = ∆Coil , where ∆Ctot is the change in China’s total energy consumption.
3.                     , where G = China’s initial GDP and I = China’s energy intensity.
4.                   , where %G is the percent change in China’s GDP.
5. This step revises the calculation of  step 2. A new formula is introduced implicitly,
                                  where Ccoal/gas is China’s consumption of  coal and gas, χ is the 
cross-elasticity of  coal and gas consumption to oil price, and Poil is the price of  oil. 
The expression for the total change in China’s energy consumption is now 
                                      . This expression is now substituted into the formula
                       , as follows:
Next, we substitute for ∆Coil , as above:                        . We also substitutefor ∆Poil/Poil, 
as obtained earlier in the paper:                     , where E is the price elasticity of  oil. We 
therefore obtain:
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